Meritocracy in John Rawls’s theory of justice

Abstract

The goal of this text is to reconstruct John Rawls's thesis against using merit as a distributive criterion. Consequently, the problem arises as to whether its exclusion as a normative criterion of distribution violates (or not) some norm of equity or equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of cooperation. Likewise, Rawls's normative perspective has raised objections in favor of merit and its worth as a distributive criterion, even in unequal and unjust societies. The most solid argument to which this position refers is that this type of company is objectionable because it does not recognize some criterion of merit (v.g., effort) to determine who should obtain more resources and opportunities. In light of these considerations, this paper makes a defense of John Rawls's position in relation to merit and its invalidity as a distributive criterion, even in ideally egalitarian societies.